Increasingly complex systems lead to an interweaving of security, safety, availability and reliability concerns. Most dependability analysis techniques do not include security aspects. In order to include security, a holistic risk model for systems is needed. In our novel approach, the basic failure cause, failure mode and failure effect model known from FMEA is used as a template for a vulnerability cause-effect chain, and an FMEA analysis technique extended with security is presented. This represents a unified model for safety and security cause-effect analysis. As an example the technique is then applied to a distributed industrial measurement system.
Introduction
With interconnected and software intensive systems, availability and safety depend increasingly on security aspects. Threats to information security also threaten the availability or safety of a system [1] . Dependability of software intensive systems depends not only on the reliability of the used software but also on the security of the Information System. Information security is increasingly interwoven with all aspects of dependability [2] . Recent events like Stuxnet 1 or Duqu 2 demonstrated vulnerabilities in industrial or embedded IT-Systems. In order to remove or reduce these risks holistic analytical methods are necessary. The Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA) is a structured technique which investigates failure modes and their effects. The aim is to identify potential weaknesses and improve reliability, availability or safety. A system or process is hierarchically decomposed into its basic elements and then the failure modes of the elements are examined for causes and effects [3] . FMEA was developed in the 1950s by the US Department of Defense to improve the reliability of military equipment [4] . Originally, FMEA was aimed at the reliability or safety of hardware.
The failure modes and probabilities for hardware components are normally well known. Although failure modes of software are more complex and coupled with a certain degree of uncertainty, Reifer and others [5], [6] showed the benefits of performing a Software-FMEA (SFMEA). As explained in [7] when an SFMEA is performed early in the design phase of software, activities for verification and validation of software are easier to execute and a more focused use of development effort is possible.
This paper describes an approach for the combined analysis of safety and security. The basic FMEA concept is extended to include vulnerabilities and attacks concerning the security of a system. A unified cause and effect model allows examining the combined risks for a system. The following method for a Failure Mode, Vulnerabilities and Effects Analysis (FMVEA) enables the analysis of complex mission critical systems. Similar to a Software-FMEA the benefits are the easier verification and validation and the ability to focus the development effort on critical areas.
After an overview of the state of the art, chapter 3 describes the new method in detail. Chapter 4 tries to prove the applicability of the FMVEA based on an example. Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the limitations and gives an outlook on further work.
State of the Art
For safety, IEC 61508 [8] is the basic functional safety standard, which covers the complete safety life cycle. It describes techniques and procedures for analysis, realization and operation of safety critical systems. With respect to security, IEC 61508 Ed 2.0 (2010) contains only a few requirements: Security threats are to be considered during hazard analysis in the form of a security threat analysis (IEC 61508, Part 1, 7.4.2.3). The ISO/IEC 27000-series describes best-practices advice for information security management. They consider classic security-critical systems such as databases, servers and corporate networks. Nevertheless, we use the terms as they are defined in the ISO/IEC 27000-series for this publication and those from IEC 61508 for safety. Although IEC 62443 "Network and system security for industrial-process measurement and control" [9] is partially aimed at industrial security, safety concerns are outside its scope.
Summarizing, a standards review shows that critical control systems have been treated by well-established safety-standards for many years, while most available security standards aim at business applications with few exceptions. The analyzed effects and causes are, indeed, different in safety and security. So, what is definitively missing is a standard which considers both safety and security equally. Without a combined approach, there is a risk to miss critical and undesirable events: Security vulnerabilities which potentially lead to safety critical events could be overlooked.
In [10] FMEA was used for the dependability analysis of web services. The approach was based on a high level design FMEA. We propose here to extend the functional FMEA [11] in order to base the analysis on a functional system model. This enables a model based analysis of all the functions at the considered abstraction level.
